

FORUM: Disarmament Commission (DC) Sub-Commission 1

QUESTION OF: Implementing international regulations for the safe use of armed Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)

MAIN SUBMITTER: Madagascar

THE DISARMAMENT COMMISSION,

Contemplating the plurality of the people killed by armed UAV air strikes in regions such as but not limited to the Middle East, as seen by the reports of the Human Rights Watch,

Deeply disturbed by the use of armed UAVs by terrorist and drug smuggling organisations, as seen by figures provided by the United States Congressional Research Service,

Guided by the report entitled “Human Rights Implications of the Usage of Drones and Unmanned Robots in Warfare” by the Directorate-General for External Policies of the European Parliament,

Desiring the promotion of a holistic regulatory and accountability framework given the uncertainty intrinsic to the rapid proliferation of UAVs which undermine the rule of law and destabilise the global security environment,

Affirming the 2014 A/HRC/25/L32 Pakistan-sponsored resolution which ensures that armed UAVs should follow international law,

Recalling the UN charter Chapter VII regarding the use of military power in defensive instances,

Noting with satisfaction the transparent policy of France regarding their use and stockpiling of armed UAVs,

Welcoming the fight by the Amnesty International to further regulations regarding the use of armed UAVs,

Accepts the principle that armed UAVs can replace direct human intervention in dangerous environments and thus take out threats for a specific country or of the general global orders,

1. Calls for strict regulations being drafted for the military use of UAVs to limit their irresponsible and arbitrary use, recognising that it is a lethal weapon, essentially limiting it solely to defensive purposes;
2. Trusts that countries will not misuse UAVs in peacetime in methods including but not limited to:
 - a) spying upon countries/cities without national government consent/warrant and/or official approval by accompanying assemblies or organizations
 - b) delivering tactical strikes of destructive payload to a specific target area/group
 - c) avoiding the flying of a UAV over populated/civil areas unless, there is the guarantee that no possible harm will be done:
 - i. by limiting the arming of UAVs,
 - ii. by limiting the UAVs time for the said surveillance/objective;

3. Emphasises the importance of guaranteed safe flying by the country the UAV belongs to, to prevent:
 - a) collisions not being tolerated due to the fact that
 - i. civilians may be injured by the debris, then the country, which owns the drone, pays for it,
 - ii. there should be air traffic that will be monitored and keep track of potential crashes that could occur while in flight;
 - b) the pilot of the UAV has the proper qualifications that are needed to fly the drone such as:
 - i. a licence/certificate which the pilot needs to obtain,
 - ii. experience of flying other aerial vehicles,
 - c) all armed UAVs should be able to automatically sense other aircraft and steer to avoid them;
4. Encourages the act of creating/using new innovations that will further benefit the safety and subject of the UAVs, such as:
 - a) equipment that could further our knowledge of UAV communications that could include fabricating a network for UAVs specifically which could also decrease the collision rate,
 - b) the creation of a data exchange of just UAVs which would not only benefit the flight but also improve navigation;
5. Proposes the establishment of a committee called the Vastly Tolerant Organization for Lives (VTOL) which will:
 - a) be made up of the members of the Security Council,
 - b) keep a register of all UAVs from UN-states, which will be updated on a yearly basis,
 - c) oversee all official UAV-missions from these UN-states;
6. Authorises the addition of an armed UAV force which will cooperate with major transnational tech companies, such as but not limited to Alphabet and Microsoft Corporation, to:
 - a) improve the software of the UN UAVs,
 - b) install a high-level anti-hacking system;
7. Appeals to the 5th General Assembly Committee, the Administration and Budgetary Committee, to provide funding for further research and development in the field of armed UAVs, which will hopefully result in:
 - a) improving the accuracy of the missiles and limit collateral damage.
 - b) improving the software used and limit the possibility of hackers getting hold of the UAV and using it for terror-related purpose,
 - c) job creation across the supply chain;
8. Recommends that access of private military companies to UAVs is prohibited;
9. Further proposes that all States should incorporate anti-UAV systems that can prevent illegal UAVs in areas of national interest such as but not limited to:
 - a) national borders,
 - b) nuclear and chemical plants,
 - c) prisons,
 - d) police stations,

- e) airports;
10. Urges that all UAVs, over 250 grams, should be registered to the appropriate national authority, such as the Federal Aviation Administration in the United States, or the creation of such an institution if it does not exist, to prevent the artificial addition of guns and missiles and ensure accountability;
 11. Suggests that the use of chemical, poisonous and biological weapons be outlawed from UAVs;
 12. Further recommends that UAV military attacks must abide by the following cumulative conditions, they must:
 - a) be directed against a specific national or international threat,
 - b) be planned in such a way to limit erroneous targeting and collateral damage,
 - c) be suspended when the targeted individual is taken out,
 - d) not include the use of outlawed weapons;
 13. Asks that all states that have ratified the ICJ charter refer all other states that have ratified the charter to the ICJ if they have misused their armed UAVs. urges nations to ensure that UAVs remain the accepted form of aviation based military vessels by:
 - a) Banning punitive taxes on UAVs,
 - b) Providing employees of the UAV-protection industry with job security equal to that of a normal employee,
 - c) Supporting the further research of UAVs through government incentives;
 14. Calls for UAV pilots or operators and their chain of command who have been connected to a crime are appropriately punished in accordance to international humanitarian law.

FORUM: Disarmament Sub-Commission 2

QUESTION OF: Measures to promote demobilization of child soldiers

SUBMITTED BY: Philippines

THE DISARMAMENT COMMISSION,

Defining child soldiers in accordance with the Paris Principles on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflicts 2007, as a child associated with an armed force or armed group refers to any person below 18 years of age who is, or who has been, recruited or used by an armed force or armed group in an capacity, including but not limited to children, boys and girls, used as fighters, cooks, porters spies or for sexual purposes,

Deeply disturbed that in the wars of the last decade, more children were killed than soldiers, Child victims of war include an estimated 2 million killed, 4 to 5 million disabled, 12 million left homeless, and more than 1 million orphaned,

1. Recommends the establishment of a new Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration (DDR) programme under the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) in cooperation with the United Nations Disarmament Demobilization Reintegration Resource Center (UNDDR) called the United Nations Child Soldier Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (UNCSDDRP) that would:
 - a) ensure the safety of the child soldiers from their former armed force or group
 - b) aid the demobilization process by:
 - i. bringing in specialists that are vetted by the UNCSDDRP to facilitate areas such as but not limited to education, health care (mental and physical)
 - ii. providing targeted mental health care tailored to each child by having mental illnesses diagnosed, and treated, with medication as well as children being provided with counseling on their trauma
 - iii. facilitate interaction of the child soldiers with members of their families or communities in safe environments by ensuring the families know some background of what the child has been through so they understand their child's behavior
 - iv. enabling child soldiers to tell their stories by allowing a select number of journalists and authors to interview willing children and facilitating this with specialists to ensure the safety of the child
 - v. ensuring all child soldiers have schooling tailored to their needs and skill levels so they are not behind their peers by ensuring some of those educators are trained in educating children with mental illnesses;
2. Calls upon the formation of the United Nations Agency for Border Control (UNABC) to strengthen border security so as to reduce the number of children abducted by militant groups and smuggled to other countries, as well as preventing any further recruits from entering the country such as, increasing border security through means such as but not limited to:

- a) ordering mandatory ID checks for all travelers using any mode of transportation,
 - b) creating a zero exit policy for minors without proper parental certification;
3. Urges member nations and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) to assist in the non-proliferation and ensuring the security of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) in post-conflict societies during the demobilization process as to properly deal with the surplus of weapons and prevent these weapons from falling into the hands of terrorist groups and ex-combatants by:
- a) enforcing global conventions and treaties in order to enhance global efforts to combat the proliferation of SALW, such as:
 - i. the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects (PoA)
 - ii. the International Tracing Instrument
 - iii. the Firearms Protocol of the United Nations Convention against, Transnational Organized Crime
 - b) establishing regional mechanisms such as the one in the Member States of the Caribbean Community and Common Market Implementing Agency for Crime and Security (CARICOM IMPACS) by further cooperating with the United Nations, and in particular, the Programme of Action Implementation Support System
 - c) enforcing maintenance of the security of the weapon arsenals of member states by:
 - i. dispatching UN experts and investigators to conduct annual checks of the national arsenals in order to update the system and check the security for any potential flaws
 - ii. preventing leaks of confidential information regarding the weapon arsenals by ensuring the credibility of the UN experts through background checks and training programs conducted by the UN
 - iii. recording the contents of the arsenal and immediately tracing and recovering of any lost arms to the local police, and informing NGOs such as the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA);
4. Calls for a UN organization with a database providing regular access to, but not limited to:
- a) military bases
 - b) online recruitment webpages
 - c) further recruiting settlements;
5. Requests the successful disarmament of all child soldiers and ensuring the safety and lawful handling of all surrendering child soldiers in the field by:
- a) educating soldiers in the laws of war in order to prevent the executing of unarmed and surrendering child soldiers by, creating training and recourse

centers for peacekeepers such as the one already created by the United Nations African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID)

- b) requesting that the soldiers are fully aware of consequences that will be implemented on those who do cause physical harm to a child soldier who has already surrendered by, teaching military personnel and peacekeepers how to prevent and report violations against children and interact with other child protection agencies
 - c) requesting the Security Council to supply several United Nations personnel to observe the fighting forces in order to prevent the military personnel from causing any physical harm or threats towards the child soldiers of the oppositional force
 - d) ensuring that any surrendering child soldier under the age of 15 is safely put into reintegration programs and not detained within a military prison and not trialed for their crimes committed whilst fighting as a child soldier;
6. Recommends member nations as well as the United Nations Human Rights System to assist in the role of monitoring and reporting on the 6 Grave Violations as well as other violations committed against children during times of conflict, through methods such as:
- a) the use of the Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism (MRM) established by the Security Council (SC) in 2005 by:
 - i. establishing the MRM in countries & situations where parties in conflict have been listed in the annual report by the Secretary General on children and armed conflict
 - ii. gradually decrease monitoring when all parties in the country or the situation have been removed from the list and all violations against children have stopped
 - iii. continuing the use of the MRM after removal from the list for a specific period of time, to be determined by the UN and cooperating NGOs, in order to prevent the re-recruitment of child soldiers
 - iv. ending the use of the MRM after the member nation or party in conflict has been re-evaluated and shown to have already stopped the use of child soldiers after the specific period of time
 - b) further strengthening the MRM by cooperating with the UNICEF and the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict in developing tools, guidelines, training materials and information management systems.

FORUM: Disarmament Sub-Commission 2

QUESTION OF: Measures To Fully Implement The Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT)

SUBMITTED BY: Luxembourg

THE DISARMAMENT COMMISSION,

Acknowledging that the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has been signed and nearly universally accepted by all member States of the United Nations, and that it possesses a major role in the proliferation of nuclear weapons on the global scale,

Reminding the house of the resolution 48/75L of 1993, which calls for the discussion of a “non-discriminatory, multilateral and international effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices”,

Emphasizing the fact that notable member states have not, to date, signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), however have been suspicioned of possessing nuclear weapons, thus creating possible tension amongst the international community,

Reaffirming the potential for global catastrophe if the improper use of nuclear fissile enrichment is initiated, due to the destructive and uncontrollable nature of Uranium-235 chain reactions within enclosed capsules,

Recognizing the work done by the International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM), and their calculation of existing fissile materials along with their investigation into which countries are producing and refining fissile materials,

1. Encourages the creation of public forums and advertisement campaigns on what the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) does, disseminating valuable knowledge of:

- a) the destructive capacity of nuclear weapons
- b) the benefits of eliminating the use of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU)
- c) the feasibility of conversion of HEU to Low Enriched Uranium (LEU)
- d) continuing to allow for maritime ships that use nuclear reactors, nuclear power production, research and power production, scientific research;

2. Calls for the creation of a new sub branch of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), called the Nuclear Reactor Regulation Commission (NRRC) with the purpose of creating an international organization for the exchange of information regarding non-military uses, with the objectives of, but not limited to:

- a) encouraging the use of Canada Deuterium Uranium (CANDU) reactors, and other heavy-water reactors, as they do not require enriching equipment, which can be used to produce weapons grade uranium, and they possess a safer shutdown procedure, as well as other generation III+ and IV nuclear generator concepts such as the Thorium powered Molten Salt Reactor
- b) discouraging the use of boiling water reactors, as they require Uranium enriching equipment, which can also be used for weapons grade Uranium
- c) serving as an intermediary between countries with pre-existing conflicts and conflicts that can arise, with the goals of:
 - i. presenting ways of removing fissile material production over an agreed timeline

- ii. being flexible with changing times and being able to view the perspective of both sides of an international disagreement

3. Advocates for annual reviews from the IAEA, which would call for this organization to examine fissile material stockpiles of countries who maintain nuclear facilities, by a multilateral team of inspectors;

4. Requests the creation of a sub-branch into the United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), composed of members from various nations, in which transparency is promoted between the U.N., and thus the international community, and the stakeholders, regarding the nuclear capacities of member states, through the actions of:

- a) holding semi-annual reviews/check-ups of any and all nuclear reactors within a nation, between the nation at hand and the U.N. representatives, to ensure that the use of these reactors is solely for the production of nuclear energy, and not for the production of weapons grade Uranium, nor nuclear weapons
- b) monitoring of all gas centrifuges, as they may be utilized for the production of weapons grade Uranium, and are unnecessary if the implementation of heavy-water reactors is completed
- c) meeting with border security officials in high risk areas to help them develop anti-smuggling programs to prevent materials from being acquired by dangerous parties;

5. Urges the establishment of a procedure for the disarmament of excess fissile material, through systematic, transparent disposal of fissile materials, overseen by the NRRC, by:

- a) the down-blending of HEU to LEU, removing the arms potential of the fuel
- b) the effective consumption of Plutonium or HEU in a nuclear reactor;

6. Emphasizes the need for more effective communications between the U.N. and all nations with relation to excess fissile material and production, through the means of:

- a) creating a platform which involves the U.N., and its relevant sub-branches, and non-signatories of the NPT, in order to clarify the intentions, desires, and needs of these states, through frequent conferences
- b) strengthening the ability of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to restrict and verify global exportation of nuclear equipment, by reconsidering the entrance of various states into the NSG;

7. Suggests the creation of a convention called “Convention on the Limitation of Fissile Material” which will be organized by the UN in collaboration with the IAEA, which will:

- a) urge all member states to be called to make an official policy statement on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT)
- b) ask Member States to reach a consensus on the nature of this treaty including whether it is going to be verifiable
- c) propose other materials to be included in the treaty
- d) include discussions about the limitations of the current stockpile of fissile materials like weapons-grade uranium and plutonium;

8. Proposes a 20-year program seeking to promote the use of other means such as low-enriched uranium for nuclear submarines by:

- a) proposing parties who own highly-enriched uranium intended for submarine use to reduce by 60% of their stock by:
 - i. attributing that amount for the civil use of highly-enriched uranium

- ii. diluting the usage of highly enriched uranium
 - iii. oxidizing the said amount of highly-enriched uranium
- b) help fund research in compact reactors to replace the use of highly-enriched uranium by low-enriched uranium or non-fissile fuel.

FORUM: Disarmament Committee

QUESTION OF: Preventing heavy weapons from being acquired and used by non-State actors

SUBMITTED BY: Russian Federation

THE DISARMAMENT COMMITTEE,

Noting with deep concern the heavy weapons being supplied to the rebels in Syria,

Recalling that for a long time terrorist groups and non-State actors such as ISIS in Iraq, the Taliban in Afghanistan, Al Qaida in Afghanistan and North Africa, Boko Haram in Nigeria, or Hezbollah in Lebanon, have been a major danger to humanity and human rights,

Deeply concerned by the increasing availability of sensitive data, materials used for the construction of nuclear weapons, radiological substances, potentially harmful chemicals, and dangerous biological materials,

Alarmed by the devastating impacts of attacks by non-State actors using Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) and heavy weapons along with other conventional arms,

Taking into consideration the release of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) joint investigative report in October 2016,

Keeping in mind that previous attempts made at solving this issue, such as Resolution 1540 regarding the issue of “Prohibiting non-State actors from obtaining WMDs” which was passed on the 28th of April 2004 unanimously by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC),

Alarmed by the number of member nations that have yet to sign or ratify the Convention On Conventional Weapons (CCW),

1. Asks for the UN to provide the UN Secretary General Special Mechanism with the necessary expertise, laboratories and funds, the quantity of which will be determined at the discretion of the Secretariat, in order to:
 - a) develop a rapid deployment of an investigative unit for the alleged use of heavy weapons by non-State actors
 - b) effectively investigate the alleged use of weapons such as but not limited to:
 - i. chemical weapons
 - ii. biological weapons
 - iii. Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs)
 - iv. nuclear weapons including dirty bombs
 - v. heavy weaponry;

2. Encourages all member states to, with the trusted advice of field-specific experts provided by the UN, adopt measures to restrict access to online resources whose primary purpose is to make available to non-State actors, such as terrorist groups, information regarding the construction of the weapons discussed in clause 1;
3. Suggests that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in coordination with Member States, monitor and protect nuclear power plants and other points of interest, such as hospitals, where nuclear sources may be found, with specific reference to hospitals and research institutes, in nations where security remains of a lacking standard as outlined by the United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) which would decide on the guidelines for a standard of international security in order to:
 - a) raise security in said areas
 - b) protect vulnerable sources of nuclear materials
 - c) ensure the stability of aforementioned sources of nuclear energy;
4. Urges all Member States to cooperate with the OPCW and the IAEA by means such as but not limited to:
 - a) authorizing the OPCW or IAEA to annually verify and monitor the security and size of stocks of nuclear or fissile material and weapons
 - b) announce any future intentions regarding nuclear disarmament or non-proliferation to other nations during nuclear summits or other conventions;
5. Calls upon the UN to facilitate negotiations on a Convention on Prohibiting the Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons by Non-State Actors (CPWNA) to be held with the aim of discussing questions vital to the process of eliminating threats pertaining to the acquisition of such weapons by non-State actors;
6. Recommends the United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs to prolong its mission in order for it to:
 - a) gather information, willingly given by member nations, on heavy weapons in danger of falling into non-State actors' hands in areas such as but not limited to:
 - i. conflict zones with jihadist or rebel groups
 - ii. border areas of countries near aforementioned conflict zones
 - b) catalogue all of the heavy weapons within the designated country, which will be submitted to the UNAWP so as to:
 - i. make it easier for Member States to discover and report theft of said heavy weapons
 - ii. make it easier to track the illicit trade of said heavy weapons
 - c) organize biannual conventions with Member States to discuss progress in the process of increasing secured storage of heavy weapons
 - d) lend expertise, coming from a UN panel of experts on the issue of heavy weaponry storage acting as a sub-group to the organization, to countries regarding what measures to adopt in order to most effectively store and maintain heavy weaponry;

7. Urges the UN to ensure that an arms control program is a fundamental part of the UN DDR (Demobilize, Disarm, Reintegrate) programs in order to:
 - a) control illicit heavy weapon trade through border controls and implementation of tracking systems in coordination with the UNAWP
 - b) remove heavy weapons from non-State actors' possession;

8. Supports all Member States around the world tightening current gun control laws in order to prevent terrorists and non-State actors from legally buying such heavy weapons and using them as tools to continue to spread violence and fear across their territories by measures such as:
 - a) instructing countries to disallow individuals on the terrorist watch lists from legally purchasing heavy weapons
 - b) encouraging nations to set up legislation designed to combat any illegal sale of heavy weapons between manufacturers and known dangerous non-State actors.

FORUM: Disarmament Sub-Commission 2

ISSUE: Monitoring and Curbing the Development of Advanced New Types of Strategic Weapons

MAIN SUBMITTER: Ukraine

THE DISARMAMENT COMMISSION,

Noting with concern the mass destruction strategic weapons can cause,

Deeply concerned by the difficulty of nations to defend against strategic weapons and the imbalance of power this might cause,

Reaffirming that as strategic weapons become more advanced, the subsequent increase in arms research spending is to the detriment of other government services such as healthcare and education,

Alarmed by the escalation of the tension in the Korean Peninsula due to the presence of strategic weapons,

Welcoming the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (new START treaty) between the United States of America and the Russian Federation,

Convinced by the fact that ignoring the issue of strategic weapons places global peace at risk,

Deeply disturbed by the possibility of terrorist organizations obtaining or developing strategic weapons,

Fully aware that countries find strategic weapons beneficial, due to their exceptionally long range, destructive capacity and difficulty in detecting or stopping when used,

Highly concerned by the threat that the strategic weapons possess to civilian life, since strategic targets often include communication centers and railroads, which are also used by civilians,

Concerned by the potential dangers of unmonitored development of strategic weapons,

Affirming the ideal objective of a WMD free world,

Having considered the large stocks of nuclear weapons held by Russia, the United States, France, China, and the United Kingdom,

Appreciating the continuing efforts to persuade more Member States to join the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT),

Bearing in mind that 44 signatories of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) have still not ratified the treaty,

Noting with deep concern that there are a number of industrially developed powers that possess the technological capability to manufacture nuclear weapons within one year,

Recalling The Hague Code of Conduct (HCOC), also known as the International Code of Conduct

against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, 25 November 2002, of which DPRK and China are not parties of,

1. Approves the definition of strategic weapons as being weapons with:
 - a) nuclear capability
 - b) the ability to be deployed over a large distance including but not limited to:
 - i. satellite weapons
 - ii. truck mounted Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs)
 - iii. Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicles (MIRVs)
 - iv. submarine weapons
 - v. chemical weapons
 - c) the automated targeting sequences to:
 - i. target known enemy points
 - ii. detect incoming threats
 - iii. target satellites
 - d) the directed energy capabilities classified as “Strategic Energy Weapons” (SEWs)
 - e) capabilities to be potentially undetectable once in use and difficult to prevent using defensive technology;

2. Strongly suggests the creation of a new UN body, the United Nations Strategic Warfare Commission (UNSWC), which will oversee the monitoring of strategic weapons and act towards their reduction by:
 - a) working towards transparency on the number and yield of strategic weapons
 - b) working towards establishing limits on the number and yield of strategic weapons
 - c) closely working together with the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to guarantee that states who are not acting according to established limits can be sanctioned as soon as possible
 - d) requesting that countries who do not currently have strategic weaponry in their arsenals refrain from developing them;

3. Recommending that all Member States in the possession of nuclear strategic weapons:
 - a) decrease their stockpile every year overseen by the UNSWC
 - b) register all new weapons built and capabilities of these weapons such as:
 - i. deployment speed
 - ii. yield
 - iii. weapon type
 - iv. delivery method
 - v. stealth abilities
 - c) register and track all active warheads;

4. Calls upon nations to support International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which works in the field of monitoring and curbing nuclear weapons;

5. Encourages space capable nations with nuclear power to refer to and abide by the Outer Space Treaty’s policies of non-weaponization in outer space;

6. Suggests that nations develop specific strategic weapons development investigative programs that would be responsible for:
 - a) investigating new components used in the creation of strategic weapons

- b) giving reports on potential advancement in strategic weaponry;
7. Authorizes the creation of a new strategic weapons reduction treaty that would be in charge of:
 - a) providing economic or trade incentives to nations in exchange for their signature and ratification of the treaty
 - b) covering several topics regarding the non-proliferation and transparency of strategic nuclear weapon developments;
 8. Urges all countries to adopt a border control system with the aim of not encouraging further movement of nuclear weaponry by:
 - a) regulating the entrance of materials used within the making of nuclear weapons, such as but not limited to weapon grade uranium
 - b) potentially confiscating materials deemed by the regulating state as dangerous or unnecessary;
 9. Further calls upon all states in possession of strategic weapons to join the existing treaties, such as the Hague Code of Conduct and join treaties that will be created by UNSWC influenced by the terms of existing bilateral treaties if they have not done so;
 10. Encourages all Member States to provide relevant documentation as provided for by the UNODA and ATT;
 11. Urges nations to ban the production and use of all weapons whose effects can be felt 6 months after detonation or drop such as:
 - a) radiation from a bomb having a yield inferior to a fissile mass of 730g on a total mass of 64 kg of enriched uranium at 80%
 - b) small explosive bombs who are scattered over an area of 5km²
 - c) any form of chemical weapons;
 12. Further encourages the discontinuation of research into further modernizing strategic weapons by:
 - a) evaluating the most advanced current form of ICBM, overseen by the UNSWC, and allowing the recognized countries to modernize up to but not beyond this point
 - b) using the inspection powers given in the new agreements to provide both delivery and strategic weapon transparency and check all nations are adhering to this;
 13. Further urges all Member States to unite for an operation to reduce the possible access of terror organisations to strategic weapons involving cutting off their economic sources and reserves by:
 - a) collaborating with home and neighbouring countries in order to learn more about the specifics of the issue
 - b) gathering a group which will be made up of volunteers and supported by UN peacekeeping troops for surveillance and intelligence to support current assets in the region
 - c) giving out United Nations funds to support actions opposing terror organisations.

FORUM: Disarmament Committee

QUESTION OF: Preventing heavy weapons from being acquired and used by non-State actors

SUBMITTED BY: Russian Federation

THE DISARMAMENT COMMITTEE,

Noting with deep concern the heavy weapons being supplied to the rebels in Syria,

Recalling that for a long time terrorist groups and non-State actors such as ISIS in Iraq, the Taliban in Afghanistan, Al Qaida in Afghanistan and North Africa, Boko Haram in Nigeria, or Hezbollah in Lebanon, have been a major danger to humanity and human rights,

Deeply concerned by the increasing availability of sensitive data, materials used for the construction of nuclear weapons, radiological substances, potentially harmful chemicals, and dangerous biological materials,

Alarmed by the devastating impacts of attacks by non-State actors using Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) and heavy weapons along with other conventional arms,

Taking into consideration the release of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) joint investigative report in October 2016,

Keeping in mind that previous attempts made at solving this issue, such as Resolution 1540 regarding the issue of “Prohibiting non-State actors from obtaining WMDs” which was passed on the 28th of April 2004 unanimously by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC),

Alarmed by the number of member nations that have yet to sign or ratify the Convention On Conventional Weapons (CCW),

1. Asks for the UN to provide the UN Secretary General Special Mechanism with the necessary expertise, laboratories and funds, the quantity of which will be determined at the discretion of the Secretariat, in order to:
 - a) develop a rapid deployment of an investigative unit for the alleged use of heavy weapons by non-State actors
 - b) effectively investigate the alleged use of weapons such as but not limited to:
 - i. chemical weapons
 - ii. biological weapons
 - iii. Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs)
 - iv. nuclear weapons including dirty bombs
 - v. heavy weaponry;

2. Encourages all Member States to, with the trusted advice of field-specific experts to be provided by the UN, adopt measures to restrict access to online resources through the banning of websites whose only goal is to spread knowledge harmful to society and to the individual, where any terrorists and other threatening individuals or groups, could acquire information regarding the fundamentals of construction of the weapons discussed in clause 1;
3. Suggests that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in coordination with Member States, monitor and protect nuclear power plants and other points of interest, such as hospitals, where nuclear sources may be found, with specific reference to hospitals and research institutes, in nations where security remains of a lacking standard as outlined by the United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) which would decide on the guidelines for a standard of international security in order to:
 - a) raise security in said areas
 - b) protect vulnerable sources of nuclear materials
 - c) ensure the stability of aforementioned sources of nuclear energy;
4. Urges all Member States to cooperate with the OPCW and the IAEA by means such as but not limited to:
 - a) authorizing the OPCW or IAEA to annually verify and monitor the security and size of stocks of nuclear or fissile material and weapons
 - b) announce any future intentions regarding nuclear disarmament or non-proliferation to other nations during nuclear summits or other conventions;
5. Calls upon the UN to facilitate negotiations on a Convention on Prohibiting the Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons by Non-State Actors (CPWNA) to be held with the aim of discussing questions vital to the process of eliminating threats pertaining to the acquisition of such weapons by non-State actors;
6. Suggests the creation of an UN run organization called the United Nations Anti Heavy Weapons Proliferation (UNAWP) which will:
 - a) gather information, willingly given by member nations, on heavy weapons in danger of falling into non-State actors' hands in areas such as but not limited to:
 - i. conflict zones with jihadist or rebel groups
 - ii. border areas of countries near aforementioned conflict zones
 - b) catalogue all of the heavy weapons within the designated country, which will be submitted to the UNAWP so as to:
 - i. make it easier for Member States to discover and report theft of said heavy weapons
 - ii. make it easier to track the illicit trade of said heavy weapons
 - c) organize biannual conventions with Member States to discuss progress in the process of increasing secured storage of heavy weapons

- d) lend expertise, coming from a UN panel of experts on the issue of heavy weaponry storage acting as a sub-group to the organization, to countries regarding what measures to adopt in order to most effectively store and maintain heavy weaponry;
7. Urges the UN to ensure that an arms control program is a fundamental part of the UN DDR (Demobilize, Disarm, Reintegrate) programs in order to:
- a) control illicit heavy weapon trade through border controls and implementation of tracking systems in coordination with the UNAWP
 - b) remove heavy weapons from non-State actors' possession.

FORUM: Disarmament Sub-Commission 2

QUESTION OF: Preventing Heavy Weapons from being acquired and used by non-State actors

SUBMITTED BY: Brazil

THE DISARMAMENT COMMISSION,

Recalling Resolution 1540 of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)(S/RES/1540), which addresses the prevention of the acquisition of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) by Non-State Actors,

Having considered the adoption of Resolution 1673 (2006), reiterated the objectives of Resolution 1540 (2004) and expressed the interest of the UNSC in intensifying its efforts to promote full implementation of the resolution,

Recognizing the need to enhance coordination of efforts on national, regional, sub-regional and international levels in order to strengthen a global response to this serious challenge and threat to international security,

Conscious that heavy weapons fall into categories such as battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large-calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles and missile launchers,

Further recalling that the UNSC adopted Resolution 1977 (2011), which reaffirms that the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

Identifying the threat to civilian and non-combatant lives through the acquisition of heavy weapons by non-state actors, especially extremist groups,

Welcoming all efforts made by member states to strengthen security across international borders and within national boundaries to thereby help in the prevention of the transportation of weaponry of all kinds across long distances,

Further recognizing international efforts made and promoted by both the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), as in Resolution 70/36, and member states, through the strengthening of national and international security,

1. Suggests that member states strengthen border patrols as a means to prevent the transportation of WMDs and heavy weapons by means such as but not limited to:
 - a) equipping border patrol stations with forms of effective defensive weaponry that pose minimal threat to civilian lives while providing security personnel with training in law enforcement under the guidelines of the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA), the Office for the Prevention of Chemical

Weapons (OPCW), and the Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention (BTWC)

- b) allotting funding to research for upgrades in surveillance technology wherein member states would be:
 - i. encouraged to share recent developments in such technologies at an annual conference called the World Security Summit, organised under the mandate of the United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs (UNODA)
 - ii. encouraged to equip their border patrol stations with such necessary surveillance equipment
 - iii. advised to approach the World Bank if incapable of allotting funds for such purposes;
2. Encourages member states in proximities to non-state actors to tighten national security by means such as but not limited to:
 - a) increasing the presence of security at peak points of travel, both international and domestic
 - b) regularly inspecting abandoned sites such as but not limited to abandoned factories, towns, and mines by national security forces to ensure that these sites are not used to warehouse or store any illicit weapons wherein:
 - i. nations would be encouraged to maintain a thorough database of such possible locations where weapons could be hidden
 - ii. member states could approach the UN for aid required to carry out such operations in the form of finance, human resources and/or technical expertise;
3. Strongly urges all member states to comply with international law and existing treaties in relation to preventing the proliferation of heavy weapons of chemical or biological substance by:
 - a) informing relevant industries to abide by the BTWC
 - b) maintaining thorough cross checks with the INTERPOL I-24/7 database, to ensure that no employees at locations such as but not limited to mines and storage facilities have past ties with criminal and/or extremist organisations;
4. Recommends the monitoring of financial transactions and heavy weapons trade across international borders, to prevent international aid to such non-State actors, hence preventing the acquisition of arms by such parties, by laying down strong legal framework, through consultation with the Sixth Committee of the UNGA;
5. Calls for the extension of the mandate and purpose of the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee (UNCTC), which currently exists under the UNSC to create and maintain a database on extremist groups, in cohesion with the INTERPOL I-24/7 criminal database and several other existing databases created by the national security apparatuses of member states to:
 - a) aid the implementation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), particularly in regions of conflict and insurgent activity, to thereby prevent such non-state actors from obtaining nuclear WMDs by means such as but not limited to theft
 - b) help member states in the management of funds and resources for existing operations in combatting extremist organisations, while also providing access to additional resources such as finances via the World Bank, existing databases

and files, as well as human resources through the United Nations Peacekeeping Force (UNPKF), with ratification by the UNSC;

6. Further encourages member states to strengthen security at storage locations of heavy weapons, WMDs and components of these weapons using methods such as but not limited to authentication by fingerprint and retinal scanners, verification of security personnel through existing criminal databases, as well as an increase in physical security to be determined by each member state wherein:
 - a) if a member state is unable to secure such locations appropriately, it may approach the UNGA and the World Bank seeking aid in terms of financial resources, Small and Light Weapons (SALWs) and human resources
 - b) member states would be encouraged to maintain relevant documentation as provided by the UNODA Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) while also encouraging the development and regulation of weapons export control, including appropriate laws and regulations, as well as but not limited to:
 - i. end to end ATT documentation regulation
 - ii. controls on funds and financing of transport services that could contribute to proliferation
 - iii. additional protections to weapons transport units in areas near to or where non-state actors operate
 - c) member states would be encouraged to keep these storage facilities as far away from urban settlements as possible, thereby reducing the threat to civilian life posed by a potential attack by insurgents;
7. Requests all member states to destroy or disarm all outdated and/or unissued heavy weapons while also safely disposing of all disarmed and/or destroyed weapons by means such as but not limited to chemical neutralisation and combustion;
8. Further requests all Member States containing hostile non-State actors to monitor internet usage, though must first obtain a court order to prove the legitimacy of the surveillance monitoring in order to prevent the proliferation of information concerning the acquisition, development and trafficking of heavy weapons,
9. Resolves to remain actively seized of the matter.