Forum: General Assembly: Fifth Committee
Issue: Financing of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)
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Introduction

The Darfur region of Western Sudan, home to 9 million people, has been immersed in armed conflict since 2003, due to a massive outbreak of ethnic violence, which has claimed the lives of approximately 300,000 people, forcibly displaced 2.7 million (IDPs), and driven several hundreds of thousands to flee to neighbouring Chad. The fighting initially erupted following a confrontation between the Sudanese government forces and rebel factions originating from non-Arab, African farming tribes which were politically and economically marginalized by the central administration in Khartoum. The Darfur crisis has been labelled a genocide by a US Congress resolution as of July 2004, as well as “the world’s worst humanitarian crisis” by the United Nations.

In response to the international community’s call for a ceasefire to the atrocities, a joint peacekeeping mission was launched in 2007, the AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), with the core mandate of protecting the civilians and promoting peace in the region. The approved budget for the
financing of UNAMID for the current period (07/2019–06/2020) amounts to $257,970,000, to be funded from a separate account approved by the General Assembly on an annual basis.

Despite recent encouraging political developments, which entail the establishment of a transitional civilian-led government, following decades of military juntas, the security situation in the Darfur region remains precarious. Although the new government, which came into power in August 2019, has committed to reaching a peace accord with rebel groups by December 2019, violence persists while armed clashes between government militia and armed forces continue to take place. Furthermore, outbreaks of criminality have been steadily increasing, especially in the Jebel Marra district in West Darfur, where 45 villages have been reportedly destroyed since mid 2018.

In response to a Sudanese government request, a recent Security Council Resolution adopted on 30 October 2019, has approved the extension of the UNAMID mandate until 31 October 2020, while also emphasizing the current transition of the UN operations from a peacekeeping phase to a peace-building one, in consideration of an envisaged drawdown of UNAMID in 2020.

It is, nowadays, widely acknowledged by the international community that a long-lasting peace in the Darfur region is intrinsically linked to Sudan’s return to political and economic stability.

Definition of Key Terms

Genocide

The deliberate destruction of a racial, religious or ethnic group. It was officially recognized as a crime under international law by the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention).

As per Article 2 of the Genocide Convention, Genocide comprises a series of acts intended to destroy, in whole or in part, national, ethnic, racial or religious groups. In accordance with the above article, such acts may entail:

a. the killing of members of such groups,

b. the inducement of living conditions meant to cause the physical destruction of members of such groups,

c. the infliction of serious bodily or mental harm on members of the groups,

d. the imposition of measures towards preventing births within the groups,

e. the transfer by force of the children population of a group to another group.
Examples of genocide may entail, inter alia, rape and other crimes of sexual violence or assault, mass executions or massacres, acts of torture, displacements, forced migration, abductions.

**Ethnic Group**

A group of people who identify with each other pursuant to a common cultural background or ties of race, language or nationality. In specific, according to the United Nations, ethnic groups may be identified “on the basis of ethnic nationality, (i.e., country or area of origin, as distinct from citizenship or country of legal nationality), race, colour, language, religion, customs of dress or eating, tribe or various combinations of these characteristics.”

**Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)**

According to the United Nations “Guiding Principles on Internal Displacements”, IDPs are “persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border.”

**Peacekeeping Mission**

The concept refers to maintaining peace by the use of military forces. Peacekeeping operations is an important tool deployed by the United Nations to implement UN mandates to assist host countries, which are torn or threatened by conflict, to achieve conditions that will ensure that peace and security reigns in the respective regions.

**Armed Militia**

Any armed group or paramilitary auxiliaries, who usually fight on behalf of a government. During a civil war or violent conflict, they may engage in hostile activities or deploy violence against civilians to pursue their individual agenda.

**Rapid Support Forces (RSF)**
The most powerful paramilitary group active in Sudan, having evolved from the Janjaweed militia, it has led, on behalf of the government, several violent counterinsurgency campaigns in Darfur against rebel groups. Following their designation, in 2015, as the praetorian guard of former President al-Bashir, the RSF have been accused by the Human Rights Watch of perpetrating horrific human rights violations and abuses against civilians in the Darfur region. Since al-Bashir’s ouster, the RSF have become one of the key players in Sudan’s politics.

Rebel Groups/ Illegal Armed Groups
Non-state armed groups, which deploy violence or engage in warfare in order to protect the interests of specific ethnic groups or tribes, or gain territorial control of a region or area they represent or originate from.

The Justice & Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA)
They are considered the most prominent rebel groups in the Darfur region, as they initiated the rebellion against the central government in 2003, which spearheaded the Darfur armed conflict. Both rebel groups form part of the broader alliance of rebel armed groups, the Sudanese Revolutionary Front (SRF), which co-signed with the Sudanese authorities and other rebel factions, in September 2019, the Juba Declaration for Confidence-building Procedures and the Preparation for Negotiation (Juba Declaration), towards a Peace Agreement by December 2019. However, as most other rebel factions, JEM and SLA do not fully embrace the power-sharing deal behind Sudan’s transitional government.

War Crimes
According to article 8 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, “war crimes” pertain to grave breaches of the provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949. Namely, as per article 8 of the above Statute, “war crimes” may include, inter alia, “any of the following acts against persons or property protected under the provisions of the relevant Geneva Convention:

a. Wilful killing;

b. Torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments;

c. Wilfully causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or health;

d. Extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly;
e. **Compelling a prisoner of war or other protected person to serve in the forces of a hostile Power;**

f. **Wilfully depriving a prisoner of war or other protected person of the rights of fair and regular trial;**

g. **Unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement;**

h. **Taking of hostages.**

### Background Information

#### History of the Conflict

As of February 2003, the Darfur region, located in Western Sudan, has been embroiled in armed conflict and violence due to escalating ethnic tensions triggered by the socio-economic marginalization of local non-Arab tribes inhabiting the peripheries by the central government based in Khartoum.

In an effort to reverse the situation, in 2001, the two main Darfuri rebel factions, the Justice &Equality Movement (JEM), and the Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA), founded by the Fur and Zaghava tribes, respectively, went on to launch armed attacks against the Sudanese Government. The latter chose to respond by adopting an “ethnic cleansing” strategy consisting mainly of mass killings, rapes, scorched-earth tactics, or forced displacement. As a result, the conflict gradually escalated to a violent confrontation between government militia and government-supported paramilitary forces, on the one hand, and rebel groups, on the other.

The combat intensified following the declaration of independence of South Sudan in 2011 and the secession of the oil reserves to the newly formed state, as paramilitary forces, sponsored by the government of Sudan, began to engage in violence, land grabs, and land control seeking to accumulate influence and income.

A 2004 intervention of the African Union to effect ceasefire, through the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), failed to improve the situation due to insufficient resources. Furthermore, the implementation of the promising Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), signed in 2006, failed to go ahead, since the accord to put an end to hostilities was not endorsed by key rebel groups. A subsequent attempt to resume peace talks in 2008, in Doha Qatar, did not produce any results either. However, in 2010, the Sudanese Government initiated negotiations with a coalition of rebel forces, the Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM), which culminated into the signing, on 14 July 2011, of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD). Nevertheless, little progress was made, in the end, as several rebel groups refused to embrace the peace accord.
The escalation of the conflict prompted the government to seek, in 2014, the support of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a group of paramilitary auxiliaries, which spearheaded a new wave of violence, communal conflict and displacements as they increasingly attacked and vandalized non-Arab communities in Darfur. Their head, M.H. Dagalo, in his capacity as an official of the Transitional Military Council (TMS), currently serves as a member of the civilian-led Sovereign Council that governs Sudan.

**Political Developments**

Following a series of pro-democracy protests, authoritarian former President al-Bashir was ousted in April 2019 by a military council, the Transitional Military Council (TMC).

After months of strife between TMC and its political opponent, the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC), a new transitional government has recently taken office, as of August 2019, under President Abdalla Hamdock. According to the respective power-sharing deal between the civilian reformers and the military, a Sovereign Council will be leading the country during a three-year period, intended to culminate in democratic elections, in 2022. The political deal, however has not been approved by certain rebel factions in Darfur, Blue Nile state and South Kordofan, raising the alarm for a potential failure of the accord and the return to civil unrest.

The Constitutional Declaration of August 2019, endorsed by the TMC and the FFC, is intended to establish a democratic state based on the rule of law and the protection of the human rights. Within this framework, institutional and legal reforms to be implemented within the 3-year transitional period, include the termination of gender, race and religious-based discrimination and the accountability for crimes committed under the military al-Bashir regime.

Following the establishment of the transitional government, considerable progress has been made in the ongoing peace talks between the government and the armed opposition factions. Specifically, in September 2019, in a good faith effort, the governing Sovereign Council co-signed with the Sudanese Revolutionary Front (SRF) and other major rebel factions a road map agreement in the form of the Juba Declaration for Confidence-building Procedures and the Preparation for Negotiation (The Juba Declaration). The model trust-building agreement is notably expected to lead to an official Peace Agreement by December 2019.

**International Intervention / UNAMID**

*The Mandate of UNAMID, as in force, pursuant to Council Resolution 2429 (2018)*

In July 2007, the Security Council authorized the establishment of a joint peacekeeping force by the United Nations and the African Union, known as UNAMID, to assume peacekeeping operations in Darfur and bring an end to violence and genocide.

Apart from its core mandate to protect the civilians and monitor human rights, with a focus on preventing gender-based violence and the perpetration of grave violations and abuses against
children as well as supporting the sustainable return of IDPs, UNAMID is tasked with the facilitation of the delivery of humanitarian assistance provided by the UN Agencies, the mediation between the Sudanese Government & armed movements within the frame of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD), and, finally, the provision of support in relation to the mediation of community conflict.

Provided that conditions on the ground have significantly improved, and subject to the ongoing review of UNAMID’s operations by the Security Council, the gradual drawdown of the UNAMID troop and police forces has been scheduled to take place in two phases, prior to the envisioned exit of UNAMID in 2020. However, the progress of the peace negotiations between the government and the armed groups active in Darfur will eventually determine whether UNAMID’s presence will be reduced or completely withdrawn by the expiry of the current mandate, in October 2020.

The Role of UNAMID in the Peacekeeping Process

Bearing in mind that Sudan is in the midst of a political transition, whilst its economy keeps shrinking as evidenced by its negative 2.3% growth for year 2019, according to recent data by the Arab Monetary Fund, UNAMID is a much-needed guarantor of ceasefire and unity against the ever-present threat of the imposition of military rule. In accordance, the effectiveness of the mission is being closely monitored to ensure compliance with strategic priorities, as reviewed by the Security Council. Further, UNAMID remains in close coordination with the United Nations Country Team (UNCT) and other regional United Nations missions and initiatives, such as the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS).

UNAMID is often plagued by security constraints, as it seeks to ensure the protection of Darfuri civilians, in an unstable and sometimes hostile political environment. Moreover, logistical constraints debilitating the humanitarian aid operation arm. Pursuant to Council Resolution 2429 (2018), which decided a substantial decrease in the strength of the military troops and police personnel, the military and police components have been reduced to 4,050 and 2,500 people respectively. Furthermore, 1,183 civilian positions have been abolished during the period 2018/19. The above figures are to be further adjusted to take account of operational requirements based on the review of the drawdown timeframe and the progress of the peace process.

Notwithstanding, after 12 years of uninterrupted UNAMID presence and decades of violent conflict, the humanitarian situation in Darfur starts to show signs of improvement. Notably, Sudan has been recently removed from the list of perpetrators of violations against children. However, the level of humanitarian assistance is forecasted to remain relatively high to address the still uncertain security situation. In addition, government-led economic reforms necessitate a social safety buffer
to absorb the impact on the poor and vulnerable people of the region. According to the WFP (World Food Programme), as of September 2019, 8.5 million people in Sudan have been deemed to need humanitarian assistance. To further aid with the security uncertainty, a milestone agreement has been signed as of September 2019 to open an Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in Sudan, with further field offices covering the Darfur area.

From a political perspective, UNAMID is currently confronted with a complex transition process intended to lead to its eventual drawdown and liquidation. However, any drawdown considerations presuppose the achievement of certain strategic objectives, including a) the completion of the integration of UNAMID and the UN country team (UNCT) across the Darfur region through the expansion of the state liaison functions (SLFs) in the Jebel Marra area of operations, b) the guarantee of a comprehensive peacekeeping presence in Jebel Marra, c) the improvement of humanitarian access to remote areas throughout North Darfur, and d) the inception of a novel UN-AU cooperative strategy intended to safeguard the longevity of a potential Darfur peace accord to be agreed between the government of Sudan and the Darfuri armed groups.

**The Renewal of the UNAMID Mandate as per Security Council Resolution 2479 (2019)**

In October 31, 2019, in response to a respective request by the Sudanese government, the Security Council unanimously adopted a draft resolution penned by the UK and Germany to extend the mandate of UNAMID until October 2020. In view of the recent inauguration of the civilian transitional government in August, member states eagerly approved the suspension of the mission’s drawdown schedule and the maintenance of the current troop and police levels for 6 months, so as not to disrupt the positively evolving political situation.

The focus of the renewed mandate has been broadened to include the political support of the recently launched peace process and the initiation of accompanying peace-building measures. The renewed mandate requires the Secretary General and the Chairperson of the AU Commission to provide by 31 January 2020 a special report comprising an assessment of the situation on the ground, an update on the progress of the peace negotiations, and finally, recommendations on the optimal course of action for the eventual drawdown of UNAMID and on the options available regarding the implementation of a follow-on presence post-UNAMID.

Finally, it is indicative of the political vision for the future engagement of the United Nations in the country that the efficiency of the UNAMID operations is up for review in March 2020 on the basis of the above mentioned assessment joint report, quite ahead of the expiry of the existing mandate in October 2020.

**UNAMID Funding**

Within the frame of the joint management of active missions’ cash balances, the Fifth Committee approved as of July 2019, a $6.51 billion for a total of 13 peacekeeping operations in 2019/20. Out of the
approved peacekeeping budget, the amount allocated to UNAMID currently stands at an average $257,970,000. It should be noted that the downward trend in the total projected expenditure, which for the period 2018/19 amounted to $715,488,200 down from $908,264,400 for the period 2017/18, depicts the sizeable decrease in the military and police presence as well as the decrease in civilian personnel and respective operational costs.

Despite the fact that the UNAMID balance is maintained in a separate fund, the UNAMID budget may be seriously affected by the failure of certain member states to pay their mandatory contributions, since cash balances are being managed as a pool. As of April 2019, it is estimated that there is an outstanding balance of $189,811,000, out of a total $15,866,484,000, in relation to payments assessed on member states since the inception of UNAMID.

Although peacekeeping is considered a most important function of the United Nations, many delegates have been advocating cost cuts towards ameliorating the Organization’s cash position. In accordance, any renewed mandate should be carefully matched with sufficient civilian, uniformed and financial capacity.

**Major Countries and Organizations Involved**

**SUDAN (The Republic of Sudan)**

The third-largest African country, with a population of 43 million people, it lies at the crossroads between the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa. Formerly under the joint rule of the United Kingdom and Egypt, the country became an independent country on January 1, 1956.

Since its declaration of independence, the country has been torn by consecutive civil wars mainly underpinned by religious, ethnic and cultural differences.

The 2011 secession of South Sudan has had a major negative impact on the country’s economic growth since it resulted in the loss of oil revenue accounting for 95% of the country’s overall exports. Furthermore, the designation of Sudan by the US as a State Sponsor of Terrorism, since 1993, has rendered the country ineligible for foreign investment and debt relief, while it bars significant trade relations.

Apart from the ongoing conflict in the western region of Darfur, conflict has recently escalated in the South Kordofan and Blue Nile States.

**SOUTH SUDAN**

Following a 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, according to which the South of Sudan gained regional autonomy, and a subsequent 2011 referendum on independence, Southern Sudan seceded from Northern Sudan and became an independent state on 9 July 2011.
Although South Sudan’s five-year civil war has only recently come to an end, the country’s authorities have been brokering for the past few months peace negotiations between Sudan’s Sovereign Council and the dissenting rebel factions.

In specific, the Juba Declaration of September 2019, which prepares the ground for the signing of a peace agreement, was signed under the auspices of South Sudanese President, Salva Kiir Mayardit. The latter has been leading the mediation team negotiating the agreement on a ceasefire between the Sudanese government and the Sudanese armed movements, especially those active in the Darfur region.

AFRICAN UNION

The African Union has been involved from the start in the Darfur crisis, intent on monitoring the ceasefire negotiations and ensuring the security of the civilian population. Since 2003, it has taken the lead to mediate between the opposing parties, often surpassing its mandate.

In 2004, the African Union set up the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), primarily as a “ceasefire monitoring body” accepted by the two main Darfur rebel groups, the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice & Equality Movement (JEM). In accordance with its changing mandate, the AMIS transformed since its inception to a major operation deploying, at its peak, armed force protectors apart from civilian police, totalling an armed personnel of 7,000.

However, as the Darfur crisis escalated, the AU, due to its operational limitations and political constraints as well as its inadequate resources, opted to cooperate with the United Nations, incorporating the AMIS into the newly established United Nations – African Union hybrid operation in Darfur.

RUSSIA & CHINA

Both have shown averse to extending the UNIMAD mandate beyond 2020, arguing that the Sudanese government is capable of restoring peace and order on its own, without foreign intervention. Especially, China has long sided with the previous authoritarian government’s position that the Darfur crisis is winding down and should not necessitate the assistance of foreign peace missions. Russia, on the other hand, although considered to have meddled, in the past, in the Darfur crisis as a political and military supporter of deposed autocratic ruler al-Bashir, it has recently consented to the renewal of the UNAMID mandate, intended to support the peace accord, pursued by the new government.

UK & GERMANY

Other stakeholders in the region include the UK and Germany, the penholders on Darfur, who penned the draft resolution for the recent extension of the mandate of UNAMID until October 2020.
Both countries have acknowledged the necessity for the political support of the ongoing peace process, and argue for the continuation of the UNAMID operation for the time being, in order to avoid “a security vacuum, and, most importantly, a possible relapse into conflict.”

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

The United States, apart from initially imposing sanctions on Sudan, which have been thereafter lifted as of 2017, have been refusing to remove the country from the US Terrorism list (List of State Sponsors of Terrorism), which, in turn, prevents the provision of financing by the IMF and the World Bank.

SAUDI ARABIA & THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

As an Arab nation, Sudan has historically enjoyed a relatively stable relationship with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Following the ouster of their former ally, authoritarian, Islamist President al-Bashir, in 2019, the countries jointly pledged a $3 billion aid package to boost Sudan’s struggling economy.

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (ICC)

The ICC has issued, since 2009 and 2010, several arrest warrants against Khartoum government officials in relation to the Darfur genocide, two of them against former President al-Bashir, on account of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. However, it has failed to prosecute them, due to a lack of political cooperation by the government of Sudan.

THE UN REFUGEE AGENCY (UNHCR)

The United Nations Refugee Agency has been closely cooperating with UNAMID for the implementation of relief policies, being active in 11 states. Apart from emergency relief programmes, the Agency provides assistance to internally displaced persons (IDPs), including those affected by the ongoing conflicts within the Darfur region. As a member of the State Liaison Functions (SLFs), developed to facilitate the eventual drawdown of UNAMID, the UNHCR has been pivotal in implementing livelihood protection and other measures.

Timeline of Events

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June 2003  Conflict begins between government of Sudan and rebel groups within the western region of Darfur.

September 2004  Darfur killings designated as genocide by US Secretary of State.

January 2005  Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM).

March 2005  UN Security Council initiates sanctions against those violating Darfur ceasefire.

May 2006  The Darfur Peace Agreement is signed between the Government and the main rebel function, the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM). Rival rebel groups, SLA and JEM reject the accord.

November 2006  A 6-month extension of African Union’s mandate of its peacekeeping force in Darfur is approved.

July 2007  The United Nations – African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) is launched, with a force of 26,000, including 19,555 troops, authorized to succeed the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS).

March 2009  The ICC issues arrest warrant for President Al-Bashir for committing war crimes and crimes against humanity in Darfur.

March 2010  The Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) signs a peace accord with the government, prompting ceasefire.

July 2010  The ICC issues second arrest warrant for President al-Bashir.

July 2011  South Sudan gains independence following January referendum.

The Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD) is signed by the government and a coalition of rebel factions.

December 2018  Sudanese Revolution – Civil revolt against al-Bashir’s authoritarian regime leads to his ouster from power in April 2019. Dozens are killed in a fierce crack-down of the protests by the government forces.

February 2019  President al-Bashir declares a one-year state of emergency in an effort to end weeks of anti-government demonstrations, which claimed the lives of 40 people.

April 2019  Military coup removes President al-Bashir from power/ Formation of Transitional Military Council (TMC).
Relevant UN Treaties and Events

- **“The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)” of 9 January 2005**
  The Agreement was signed on 9 January 2005 between the Sudanese Government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/ Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPML/A).
  Although the CPA mainly aimed at terminating the two-decade long Second Sudanese Civil War, it also increased the chances for a durable solution to the Sudanese conflict. Besides effecting a temporary ceasefire, it established a power-sharing arrangement between the North and the South, providing for the sharing of oil revenues.

- **“The Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA)” of 5 May 2006**
  The Agreement was signed on 5 May 2006 by the Sudanese Government and the SLM/A, a faction of the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM). Apart from ensuring a final ceasefire, it reproduces, in general, the power, wealth-sharing and security arrangements provided for in the DPA. Furthermore, it establishes democratic processes for the determination of Darfur’s status as a region. However, the DPA failed to be signed by important rebel groups supported...
by the African ethnic groups of Darfur, such as the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), which felt sidelined by the ruling coalition between the government and the SLM. As a result, it failed to achieve its peace objective and led instead to increased conflict.

- **“The Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD),” signed in July 14, 2011 - The Framework for the Peace Process in the Darfur Region**

  The Agreement was signed on 14 July 2011 by the Sudanese Government and the Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM). The Agreement, which was concluded following two years of negotiations, currently serves as the framework for the comprehensive peace process in Darfur. It addresses a series of issues which underlie the Darfur conflict, including justice and reconciliation, power-sharing and wealth-sharing, human rights, compensation and return arrangements for the refugees. Furthermore, it has led to the establishment of the Darfur Regional Authority (DRA) as of 2012. UNAMID has been participating in the two supervisory bodies monitoring the implementation of the DDPD, the International Follow-up Committee (IFC) and the Ceasefire Commission.

- **“Sudan Constitutional Declaration” of August 2019**

  The Constitutional Declaration “on the establishment of a new civilian-led transitional Government and transitional institutions,” was signed on 17 August 2019 between the Transitional Military Council (TMC) and the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC). It introduces the transitional arrangements for the 39-month period that will culminate in democratic elections in 2022, including the establishment of the Sovereign Council as a collective governing body.

  Inter alia, the Constitutional Declaration provides for the establishment of a Peace Commission and a Borders Commission, and it envisages the completion of a fair and comprehensive peace in Sudan within a period of six months from its signing. Finally, it designates the issues that should be addressed in such peace negotiations, which include issues of marginalization, sustainable solutions for displaced persons and refugees as well as the reconstruction of conflict-affected areas.

- **“The Juba Declaration” of 11 September 2019**

  The “Juba Declaration for Confidence-building Procedures and the Preparation for Negotiation” was signed on 11 September 2019 between the Sovereign Council and several rebel groups, such as the Sudanese Revolutionary Front (SRF), SPLM North, the Beja Congress, and the Sudan Liberation Forces Alliance of Tajir Hajar.

  The Declaration comprises certain measures to restore trust among the parties, in preparation for the peace negotiations towards the signing of a peace agreement by 14
December 2019. In addition to providing for a ceasefire, it stipulates the opening of humanitarian corridors and safe passages. Pursuant to the signing of the Declaration, peace talks have already been launched as October 2019.

  In response to the massive humanitarian crisis in Darfur, the Resolution authorized the deployment in 2007 in Sudan of the hybrid AU-UN mission (UNAMID), intended to succeed the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS). The initial mandate has since been adjusted to reflect the transfer of several of its tasks to the UN country team (UNCT).

- “Extension of UNAMID Mandate until 31 October 2020,” 31 October 2019 (S/RES/2495)
  Apart from extending UNAMID’s mandate until 31 October 2020, the Resolution maintains the police and military ceilings at current levels until the next mandate review, due in March 2020. In accordance with the operation model approved by Security Council Resolutions 2363(2017) and 2429 (2018), the Resolution commits to peacekeeping in the greater Darfur area and peacekeeping in the rebel stronghold area of Jebel Marra.

- “GA Resolution on UNAMID Budget,” 22 December 2007 (A/RES/62/232)
  The initial budget of the mission, approved in 2007, for the period 2007/08 amounted to $1.48 billion, commensurate with the status of UNAMID as the second largest peacekeeping force.

  The above ACABQ Report recommended a further reduction of proposed resources for the UNAMID mission by $2.5 million, due to the pattern of expenditure and the envisaged downsizing of UNAMID. It should be noted that the approved budget for UNAMID marks a further decrease in relation to ACABQ’s recommendation. Considerations about UNAMID’s exit in 2020 have been driven by political pressures to effect further cuts in the UN peacekeeping budget.

Previous Attempts to solve the Issue

Although UNAMID has been admittedly an expensive mission, its hybrid form has allowed, to an extent, the efficient allocation of cost intense activities between the African Union and the United
Nations, which have shared apart from the political responsibility, the logistics, as well as the military obligations incurred. However, the limited budget capacity of the AU has translated into increased UN financial contribution to the mission. The issue correlates to the non-timely payment of contributions by certain member states.

Despite forming for years, since its 2007 deployment, the second most expensive peacekeeping mission of the UN, the UNAMID budget has unsurprisingly marked a sharp decrease, from US$1,153,611,300 per fiscal year 2015 to US$257,970,000 in 2019-20. In accordance, despite previously voiced concerns for its financing, the recent approval of the draft Security Council Resolution for the extension of the UNAMID mandate by one year has been unanimous.

Overall, UNAMID has been a comparatively successful peacekeeping mission that has provided Sudan with substantial humanitarian assistance, preventing, at the same time, an all-out civil war. The successful completion of the mission should not be, therefore, compromised in an attempt to achieve cost savings.

Further, a detailed breakdown of the budget sheds light on potential shortcomings while it confirms the compliance of the current priorities of the UNAMID mission with its mandate.

Finally, in view of the envisioned drawdown of the mission as early as 2020, it may be argued that the scale of operations and the scope of the mission should be closely monitored and periodically reviewed in order to ensure that appropriate financial savings are achieved.

Possible Solutions

An explicit consideration of UNAMID exit or renewal options should be facilitated by the next joint report by the Secretary General and the AU, scheduled for January 31st 2020. The latter, apart from reporting on the peace progress in Darfur, is expected to make recommendations regarding, the strategy, scope, and potential timing of the UNAMID drawdown, taking into account the sensitive negotiation stage of the unravelling peace process.

Looking forward, Options may entail:

Indefinite or Scheduled Delay of UNAMID Drawdown/ Guarantee of ceasefire during 3-year transitional period, while ensuring return to democratic rule.

To the extent that violent confrontations persist due to resistant armed movements, the approval of an indefinite delay in the phased drawdown of the UNAMID may be justifiable, especially in view of the ongoing peace process.

In the meantime, the deliberations for the adoption and implementation by relevant stakeholders of a peace accord may benefit from the establishment of a Joint Task-force between
the UN, the AU and the Khartoum government to retain humanitarian help in selected areas of enhanced conflict, as well as the designation of confidence-building measures (CBMs).

Involvement of International bodies should seek to guarantee Sudan’s compliance with international human rights law and treaties, including but not limited to the ratification of the Geneva Conventions and the U.N. Convention against torture (CAT).

Cost-effectiveness and management reforms to be set in place may allow the phased decrease in troop levels and police ceilings towards achieving a more efficient allocation of resources. Notwithstanding, any cost cutting initiatives should not be prioritized to the detriment of operational efficiency and should be combined with management reforms.

Targeted disarmament of military auxiliaries and paramilitary forces through judicial redress and engagement in peace negotiations should be seen as pivotal towards the deactivation of rebel groups in Darfur and their cooperating factions in South Kordofan and the Blue Nile State.

*Reframing of Mandate/ Transition from Peacekeeping to Peace-building.*

Amidst the envisaged drawdown of UNAMID in 2020, the transition from peacekeeping to peace-building necessitates the adoption of a follow-on mandate of political nature, to assist in the peace process and ascertain the priority of civilian protection, in combination with the provision of increased financial support of the UN Sudan country team. The transition phase may be facilitated by the approval of short technical roll-over/s of mandate.

In the meantime, a peaceful transition with a minimum impact on the host country’s financial situation should also provide for the extension of the Darfur Community Peace and Stability Fund (DCPSF) beyond 2021, or the creation of other multi-donor trust fund (MDTF) or other type of financial assistance program to support peace-building efforts at the community level.

The implementation of legal and judicial reforms to expedite the protection of human rights and the return to democratic rule will ensure the removal of the country from the list of state sponsors of terror, opening up the country to foreign investment, preparing the ground for the financial intervention and assistance by the IMF and the World Bank. In this regard, government-led economic reforms should benefit from foreign technical expertise and economic aid.
Bibliography


“SUDAN FACTSHEET.” *UNHCR*, United Nations


Appendix or Appendices

I. Reports of the Advisory Committee on Administrative & Budgetary Questions
https://www.un.org/ga/acabq/documents?session%5B%5D=73&year%5Bvalue%5D%5B%5D=all&type%5Breport%5D=report

II. SG Reports on the African Union - United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur
https://unamid.unmissions.org/sg-reports

III. Security Council & GA Resolutions related to UNAMID
https://digitallibrary.un.org/search?ln=en&cc=Resolutions+and+Decisions&p=%22AU%2FUN+Hybrid+Operation+in+Darfur%22+OR+UNAMID&f=&action_search=Search&rm=&ln=en&sf =year&so=d&rg=50&c=Resolutions+and+Decisions&c=&of=hb&fti=0&fti=0
### IV. Budget Performance for the period from 1 July 2017 to 30 June 2018, and Financing for the period from 1 July to 31 December 2019 of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur

*(Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions/24 April 2019)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Appropriation for 2017/18</td>
<td>$910,941,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expenditure for 2017/18</td>
<td>$908,264,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unencumbered balance for 2017/18</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appropriation for 2018/19*</td>
<td>$715,522,700</td>
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<tr>
<td>Projected expenditure for 2018/19</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Projected under-expenditure for 2018/19</td>
<td>$34,500</td>
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<tr>
<td>Request of the Secretary-General to enter into commitments, with assessment, for the period from 1 July to 31 December 2019</td>
<td>$269,920,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjustment recommended by the Advisory Committee for 2019/20</td>
<td>($2,500,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recommendation of the Advisory Committee for the period from 1 July to 31 December 2019</td>
<td>$267,420,900</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Estimates as at 28 February 2019.*

*Source: United Nations-ACABQ Report A/73/755/Add10*
V. UNAMID Presence in Darfur

UNAMID PRESENCE AT THE START OF THE 2019/20 PERIOD

Source: United Nations-GA (A/73/785)