Introduction

After the First Libyan Civil War, in the midst of the Arab Spring in 2011, the decades-long rule of Moammar Gaddafi was brought to an end in which the rebels were supported by NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization). The extrajudicial termination of the life of the former dictator in the hands of the people from the chains of the former authoritarian regime, yet it turned out to mark the start of further turmoil and strife among the peoples of the country, stained further by jihadi terrorism escalating the violence and the human rights violations. The oil sector, the backbone of the nation’s economy collapsed as it fell to the control of the internationally non-recognized party who was restricted under sanctions. While many peace negotiations were attempted, none reached definitive success, with the situation relapsing back into violent conflict each time. The internationally recognized party now appears surrounded in the capital by their opponents, leaving the future of the country in question. It remains the duty of the Security Council to address this conflict, to build the required bridges to bring the prolonged conflict in the country finally to a peaceful resolution.

Definition of Key Terms

Arab Spring

The series of protests observed mainly in the year 2011 in Arab-majority countries of the Middle East and North Africa region, for the purpose of democratizing the authoritarian regimes in power, and demanding fair elections, which were mostly cracked down by the said governments. Some of these protests achieved the overthrowing of the present regime, but even then, the change tended to not last for long.

Government of National Accord (GNA)
GNA is the Tripoli-based, internationally recognized (including by the United Nations) government of Libya. However, their territorial control is extremely limited, and even those territories are mostly protected by militias instead of a central army. They are noted to be generally more Islamist in ideology.

**Libyan National Army (LNA)**

LNA is the main rebel group engaged in armed combat against the LNA, propping up the Tobruk administration, and in control of most of the country’s territories, including its oil fields. While its legitimacy has not been recognized internationally, under General Haftar’s (full title: Supreme Commander Field Marshal General Haftar) rule, it has become the most influential force in the country. LNA is generally believed to have a more reformist ideology than the Government of National Accord.

**Islamic State (IS)**

IS is an international terrorist entity with claims that its leader is the Islamic caliph. In conjunction with their agenda of spreading their extreme interpretation of fundamentalist Islam, they had sought to make territorial gains in the void of governance that had been present in the country.

**House of Representatives (HoR)**

HoR is the parallel government, in the form of a parliamentary assembly, based out of Tobruk claiming full rights over the entirety of the country. While they are supported by the LNA, the power structure between the two entities make HoR dependent on the LNA, making them obey LNA whenever there is a subject of dispute, as has been observed in the negotiation process for the Libyan Political Agreement.

**National Transitionary Council (NTC)**

NTC was the coordination committee responsible for governing the rebel-controlled areas during the First Libyan Civil War. While they were dissolved after the democratic elections, they were noted for being incredibly divided among themselves in political opinions, foreshadowing the issues to come in the following years.

**General National Council (GNC)**

GNC was the first democratically elected parliament in Libya, with a government being formed from its members. It gained power after the elections of 2012, where 2.5 million of the 6 million population of the country cast votes, with the dissolution of the NTC, and lost its internationally recognized status.
after the 2014 elections, which were followed by various militias disassociating themselves from the GNC and seizing territory.

**UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL)**

UNSMIL is a non-military political missions established in Libya by the United Nations at the request of the Government of National Accord. It is connected to UN Department for Political Affairs (UNDPA), rather than the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). It aims to assist the GNA and help in its “consolidation of governance, security, and economic arrangements,” as well as support humanitarian causes such as women’s empowerment and reporting on the situation the human rights in the country.

**Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Libya (SRSG)**

The SRSG serves as the head of UNSMIL, is appointed directly by the Secretary-General, and represents in the region and reports on developments in the country to the Secretary-General. He is the highest-ranking UN official in Libya.

**Libyan Political Agreement (LPA)**

LPA was the first agreement reached between the House of Representatives and the General National Council in 2015 but could not be implemented due to General Haftar’s staunch opposition. It proposed the GNA to become the parliament of a unified Libya, which it did, although due to HoR’s non-participation in the enforcement of the decisions, it had limited territorial control, for a High Council of State to form as a powerful advisory council to the government, and a government to form in the shape of Presidency Council for the Council of Ministers, with the HoR becoming the temporary government and parliament, due to its 2014 electoral mandate, until the next elections are held.

**Action Plan for Libya (APL)**

The APL was a 2017 proposal for numerous amendments to be passed on the LPA, with support from the UN, although a lack of popularity resulted in it being simply forgotten on the regional level.

**Operation Libya Dawn**

Operation Libya Dawn was the military operation conducted by Islamist militias to seize Tripoli and its surrounding areas, in reaction to General Haftar’s seizing of various territories across the nation. It would eventually lead to the formation of the new GNC and, subsequently, GNA.
Petroleum Facilities Guard (PFG)

PFG is the militia controlling and managing some of the oil fields of Libya, the chief source of export income for the country when not under sanctions. It had initially been loyal to the Libyan National Army, though it has since then defected and lost control of much of its territory.

Background Information

To understand the situation in Libya present and to devise a solution to the status quo, the past of the conflict must be understood, to pin down what solution attempts have worked and which have not, as well as to gain a grasp of the dynamics leading to the conflict. While this will provide delegates with an understanding of the political and military aspects of the situation in the country, economical and humanitarian aspects of the issue will then be elaborated upon to allow for a comprehensive understanding of the issue.

History of the conflict

In February 2011, as the Arab Spring movement made its impact across the Arab world, prompting protests in authoritarian regimes asking for democratic rights, such as freedom of expression and fair and transparent elections, in Libya, a series of similar protests took hold and were cracked down upon by the government. The city of Misrata, near the capital Tripoli, which would come to be known for their powerful militias, began the revolution by forcing out the government’s forces and seizing control. The SC acted vigorously, imposing sanctions on the leaders of the country and referring them to the International Criminal Court. The day after, less than two weeks after the first protests, the National Transitionary Council (NTC) would be formed with participation across the country and would soon declare themselves the “sole representative of Libya”, gaining recognition in just a few days from some international powers and hosting themselves in Benghazi. It was in these times that General Haftar returned to Libya from the US, to form a militia in the east of the country. He was a powerful general under Gaddafi’s rule before being exiled and would once again rise to eminence in the country’s history.

In the middle of March, the government would come close to terminating the NTC by re-capturing Benghazi but would be stopped by Western forces which would counter them both politically and militarily. With Gaddafi recognizing the threat posed by the rebels, he offered a peace plan on the 10th of April but was powerfully rebuffed by the NTC. Along the same times, NATO would shift its defensive activities in support of the NTC to the offensive, bombing the capital, Tripoli. After nearly three months, the US recognizing NTC’s authority, the killing of the head of the NTC’s military activities, and the first
draft of a constitutional declaration, the city would fall to the hands of the NTC, which would then move on a quest to find Gaddafi. The NTC would succeed in this goal in late October, two months later. The UN Support Mission in Libya would be formed around the same time, with the intention of supporting the NTC and realizing stable democracy in the nation. Shortly after Gaddafi’s discovery in Sirte and summary execution, NTC would declare its victory in what is now known as the First Libyan Civil War.

While the NTC began its course with a hopeful outlook, in the new year, a series of clashes among the militias supporting the new government would begin to raise tensions among the citizens. In July, the promise of democracy would finally appear to become a reality, with the General National Council (GNC) being elected. Within a month, the power transition would officially take place and after another, the first elected prime minister would take office; however, he would not last for long in the seat, being removed after a single month. The tensions and the clashes would continue to become more common in 2013, eventually resulting in destabilization in major cities. In August, the Petroleum Facilities Guard would cease the extraction of oil, wanting the East of the country, which contains the oil fields, to be given more of the revenues of the sales and more political control, would not be granted by the government.

2014 would mark a new high in the tensions. Works would begin to prepare a new constitution and the GNC would draw ire by refusing to disband for re-election at the end of their turn. Many leaders would be ousted with no-confidence votes but one of them would succeed in asking the PFG to continue operations. With Egyptian and UAE support backing them, the Libyan National Army (LNA) would seize the capital, which marked the start of the Second Libyan Civil War. Within just a week, the LNA would be forced out by the Misratan militias and the GNC. The House of Representatives elections would take place as a replacement for the GNC and the Islamist and Misratan militias would conduct Operation Libya Dawn to counter Haftar’s claims. At the same time, a GNS would be formed. By the end of July, Benghazi would have fallen mostly to the rebels and by the middle of August, so would Tripoli, forcing the LNA to relocate to Tobruk. During this time, ISIS would have began developing roots in the country, which manifested in the seizure of a city in October, expanding to Sirte and some of the coast in 2015, presenting itself as a major player in the region. 2015 would also bring with it, in December, further talks between the two sides, which would result in the Libyan Political Agreement, despite the LNA’s eventual rejection thereof. The city of Sirte would be taken back from the terrorists in the year 2016, with US support. 2017 would feature new negotiations between the sides, which would work towards The Action Plan for Libya, which would feature amendments to the existing constitutional drafts, despite the HoR’s eventual withdrawal from the talks.

Status quo of the conflict
Since 2017, additional fighting and minor attempts at having talks, characterized less by a desire for peace than an attempt at portraying themselves as the “right” side in the international sphere, have taken place. General Haftar has even gone on somewhat of a tour of the region and of Europe, visiting various countries to show himself to be a diplomatic, peaceful and amenable statesman. The remainder of ISIS-controlled territories have been recaptured and a large territorial grab push by the LNA has taken place, squeezing the Government of National Accord and the militias that support it to the capital, Tripoli, and Misrata. The south-southwest of the country is currently controlled by local forces, but it is likely that with LNA’s strong and well-equipped army, much resistance would not be possible against Haftar’s troops.

The threat caused by the Islamic State in the country has diminished significantly in the last few years, with them currently being in control of no territory at all. However, their past dominance in large regions of the country undoubtedly illustrates the potential for a jihadi terrorist group to create an insurgency in the country, in addition to the civil war at hand. Furthermore, the fact that the Islamist militias are being presently trapped around Tripoli, with the Libyan National Army (LNA) advancing slowly but steadily on their territory might potentially cause for some members of these groups to disband and regroup elsewhere. The fact that the IS recently announced a new caliph after the death of al-Baghdadi may provide additional momentum to any attempts of recreating an IS-controlled zone in the nation, constituting a threat that the delegates must be aware of.

Government of National Accord (GNA) is in the poorest state since its establishment, being surrounded on nearly all sides by advancing LNA forces, and being trapped in only two cities, those being the capital, Tripoli, and Misrata. While due to Misrata being a thriving ground for militias that are largely supported by the locals, as well as the fact that it does not appear to have a short-term strategic importance for General Haftar, it is unlikely to be a military target soon, the LNA are advancing on Tripoli, and the only armed forces that the GNA can rely upon currently are the militias from Misrata, and more significantly, Islamist groups, which restrict the freedoms possessed by the GNA greatly, as far as policymaking and ensuring security goes. In fact, these Islamist militias have been reported to violate the human rights of those living near the areas they are active in on many cases, and it is apparent that the government is unable to exert any decision-making power on said groups. It must also be mentioned that the Misratan militias are likely to withdraw their support if their objectives of protecting their hometown is put in question for any reason, which would greatly reduce the military support the GNA currently enjoys. The GNA is supported by Qatar and Turkey and is recognized by the UN as the legitimate government of Libya, but their future prospects are rather bleak, in the lack of any significant developments, and ability to exert control over the entirety of the country are incredibly limited.
The House of Representatives also has limited control over its military forces, the LNA, as HoR is more dependent on LNA, than the LNA is on HoR. Furthermore, due to the sheer military strength of the LNA, it is apparent that should the HoR ever cross the interests of LNA, General Haftar can simply overrule the HoR, as has been illustrated in the negotiations for Libyan Political Agreement when the future role of Haftar was being discussed. It, however, has some degree of control over the civil aspects of life in most of the country. It is supported in unofficially by France, as has been illustrated in various circumstances, and officially by Egypt and Russia.

The LNA is the most powerful player in the region, as the army controlling the most territory, but chooses to lend its support to the HoR on social and economic aspects of governance, in exchange for adherence to its supreme commander’s demands and being subject to his veto. It enjoys some degree of military support, although unofficial, by Egypt and France and has the largest, most well-ordered, best trained, best equipped, and most powerful army in the country, and these advantages have been reflected in its dominance as far as territorial control goes, controlling virtually every part of the country outside of the southwest extremes and Government of National Accord’s two major cities. Among its territory may be found some of the most valuable oil fields in the country, as well as the key towns of Benghazi (where its headquarters are located) and Tobruk, where the House of Representatives government is based. Due to the sheer power he holds in his person, not in an entity he merely represents, it is apparent to some degree that any potential deal would require his approval, even if countries may not find this in line with their policies, requiring mutual compromise. His recent diplomatic tour, as well as his official statements seem to indicate that he would be willing to negotiate a deal with the GNA for the future of the country. However, the current position that no position may be held by Haftar in a future government poses a problem in the way of such a deal, as he wants a permanent position in any future government, regardless of election outcomes.

The economic situation

Even before the civil wars, the Libyan economy was dependent mostly on the oil sector and the secondary sectors that were based on the economic activity of the oil sector. This made the economy very vulnerable to any kind of disaster, whether natural or man-made, that could affect the health of this sector. As the civil war struck, it became apparent that control of the oil fields would be of crucial interest to any side, prompting an independent, local force, the Petroleum Facilities Guard, to seize control of the fields. The PFG would change its alignment many times during the war, in the first years, aligning with the Libyan National Army, and then working mostly independently; however, this would prompt the LNA to invade most of the oil fields themselves, to capture this potential source of great economic power.
Aside from the control of the oil fields, the extraction and sales of the petroleum have been a large problem during the war. Due to limited manpower and damage to infrastructure caused by the fighting around the region, the oil output has plummeted. To make the matters worse, the UN sanctions placed on Libya limit the exports of oil to the black markets, where the demand for it is weaker, resulting in the limited quantity of oil that is extracted being sold for low margins of profit. This is not to suggest that sanctions must necessarily be removed, but to show the multifaceted nature of sanctions and their impact on a nation’s economy.

This has resulted in the dependent sectors to also collapse, and with money being taken out of the system to fund the constant fighting, the civil economy has crumbled under pressure and hyperinflation that has resulted from this pressure (though the rates have recently relatively stabilized), with dire consequences, as elaborated on below.

**The humanitarian situation**

As typical for civil wars, due to the fighting being focused mostly on the major cities (and oil fields), the war had an immense impact on civilians in the country, causing casualties due to fighting, as well as displacing many of them. The numbers of refugees, that is persons displaced outside of the country, remained rather low, on a comparative basis, perhaps owing to the location of the country and there being a sea between the nearest MEDC (more-economically developed country) and Libya and being surrounded by countries with regimes of problems of their own, as well as there being relative stability in some other Libyan cities like Tobruk (due to the powerful Libyan National Army control in the city). Despite the low number of refugees, there were many persons interally displaced by the war, moving to other cities and rural areas in the country where there is little to no combat. This does not mean, however, that the displaced persons constitute no humanitarian crises -some of those who attempt to cross the Mediterranean to Italy die on the way, with the illegal transportation ships being more vulnerable to dangerous nautical conditions and sinking before they make their way across. The refugee populations in Libyan cities and towns overburden the infrastructure of these population centres, resulting in some internally displaced persons to live in unsanitary, poor conditions.

The aforementioned pressure on the nation’s vulnerable economy has resulted in the money supply being expanded by the governments, to fund their exploits, and with employment opportunities decreasing sharply, and the economy stagnating, the inflation rates have gone well beyond what any economy in the world can stand by. People have found themselves unable to afford even the most basic food and sanitation items, resulting in hunger among the population in the cities, especially among the IDPs who could not adjust themselves to the crumbling local economies. The sanctions, while they may seem limited to only the armament ("defence") and energy sectors, the latter has eliminated nearly all of
the exports of the country, and with no governmental entity secure enough to provide a guarantee for foreign loans, import rates have also plummeted. This situation has serious affected the health sector, with pharmaceutical drugs and other medical goods becoming no longer affordable by vast swathes of the population, illustrating how sanctions in one sector can affect most other sectors, even if not intended. This situation has made the treatment of those injured and sick very difficult, with hospitals and similar medical infrastructure being destroyed by the war, as well. This has resulted in a sharp increase in the number of people dying from preventable causes in the country, even among the civilians.

Not all of the humanitarian problems caused by the war are direct results of the sanctions and displaced persons, either; both sides have shown little respect for human rights in the conflict zones, sacrificing them should they get in the way of military objectives. Extrajudicial killings and other punishments, prisons of dubious legality and extremely poor and oppressive conditions, and oppression of other human rights like that of speech have been reported for either party, in addition to the lack of or poor access provided by these governmental entities (irregardless of their legitimacy) to healthcare and education for their denizens.

The nutritional, sanitational, medical, and refugee and internally-displaced persons' problems all pose significant challenges for the delegates to tackle, in addition to the problem of nation-building and infrastructure-redevelopment that must take place after the war for the country to recover and stabilize after the country, a detail that is often omitted in foreign governments’ plans on intervening in internal conflicts around the world.

**Major Countries and Organizations Involved**

**France**

Although France has claimed to be impartial in the conflict, they play a major role in the country, and have gone on record as having conducted bombings in the country favouring the Libyan National Army. It has also been noted that LNA wields some French weaponry, prompting the Government of National Accord to ask questions about their role in the conflict.

**Egypt**

Egypt actively supports the House of Representatives in the conflict, desiring to be able to influence the future of the country under a potential HoR government in the future, in line with its aims of becoming a regional power for North Africa.
Russian Federation

The Russian Federation is also in support of the HoR government and has even hosted General Haftar as a diplomatic guest when he was on a tour to boost his international prestige. While officially disputed, there have been reports of Russian mercenaries participating in the war, and Russia has been accused with trying to prolong the war in the hopes of increasing their regional influence.

Turkey

Turkey has expressed its support for the Government of National Accord in the conflict. They have been reported to have violated the arms embargo put on Libya in their efforts to support GNA.

Tunisia

Due to its neutral stance in the conflict, Tunisia has served as a mediator in the past in negotiations and talks between the two parties and may potentially be called upon to serve a similar role in the future.

UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL)

As elaborated above, the UNSMIL aims to support the GNA’s government through non-military methods, to bolster human rights of and reliable governance for the peoples of the country. Unlike many UN missions, it actively takes a side in the issue, although this position is not solely due to the UN recognition of the Government of National Accord, but more so due to the GNA’s use of this position by asking the UNDPA to provide support for reliable governance in the country.

Timeline of Events

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Description of event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15 February 2011</td>
<td>“The Day of Rage”: Large groups of people, inspired by the larger Arab Spring movement for democratization, go out to the streets around the country, protesting against a human right activist’s arrest, before the government cracks down violently on the protestors.</td>
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<td>24 February 2011</td>
<td>Local militias clash with and drive away Gaddafi’s forces in Misrata.</td>
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<td>26 February 2011</td>
<td>UNSC puts its first sanctions on the Gaddafi government.</td>
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<td>Date</td>
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<tr>
<td>27 February 2011</td>
<td>The National Transitionary Council is formed in a meeting in Benghazi.</td>
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<td>15 March 2011</td>
<td>General Haftar returns to Libya from the US.</td>
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<td>16 March 2011</td>
<td>Gaddafi’s forces begin their final approach on Benghazi.</td>
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<td>17 March 2011</td>
<td>UNSC declares Benghazi a no-fly zone.</td>
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<td>19 March 2011</td>
<td>Operation Odyssey Dawn: NATO forces begin conducting defensive airstrikes on Gaddafi’s forces around Benghazi.</td>
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<tr>
<td>10 April 2011</td>
<td>Gaddafi offers a peace deal to the rebels but is rebuffed by the NTC.</td>
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<td>30 April 2011</td>
<td>NATO targets the capital, Tripoli, with offensive airstrikes.</td>
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<tr>
<td>27 June 2011</td>
<td>Arrest warrants are issued for Gaddafi and some other members of his government.</td>
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<td>2 August 2011</td>
<td>The NTC drafts the first proposal for a constitution.</td>
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<td>21 August 2011</td>
<td>Rebels enter and conquer Tripoli, with little opposition.</td>
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<td>16 September 2011</td>
<td>UNSMIL is formed to assist in the transition.</td>
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<tr>
<td>20 October 2011</td>
<td>Gaddafi is located by the rebels and is killed brutally by the crowds.</td>
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<td>23 October 2011</td>
<td>NTC declares definitive victory.</td>
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<tr>
<td>January 2012</td>
<td>First reports of rebel militias’ infighting emerges.</td>
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<tr>
<td>7 July 2012</td>
<td>First democratic election in decades is held, with 2.5 million Libyans voting for the General National Council representatives.</td>
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<td>8 August 2012</td>
<td>NTC transfers its power and status to the GNC.</td>
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<td>11 September 2012</td>
<td>The GNC elects its first prime minister. On the same day, some militants attack the US Benghazi Consulate, killing the ambassador.</td>
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<tr>
<td>7 October 2012</td>
<td>The PM is dismissed by the GNC. A new PM is chosen in a week.</td>
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<tr>
<td>17 August 2013</td>
<td>The Petroleum Facilities Guard stops oil operations, asking for federalism, transparency, and further investment into the east of the country.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
7 February 2014  The GNC’s term comes to an end, but it does not dissolve itself, prompting protests.

14 February 2014  Libyans elect representatives for a constitutional assembly.

11 March 2014   The PM is replaced by the GNC once more.

7 April 2014   A deal is reached with the PFG, reopening some of the airfields.

13 April 2014  The PM resigns due to personal security concerns.

17 May 2014   Operation Dignity begins: The militia Libyan National Army, led by General Haftar, accompanied by Egyptian and UA Emirati air forces, fight with Islamist militias, with the government charging the LNA with a coup attempt.

18 May 2014  The LNA forces enter the capital Tripoli.

23 May 2014  Misratan militias enter Tripoli to fight LNA in the name of GNC.

3-4 June 2014 The country sees two new PMs in two days.

25 June 2014 Elections for a House of Representatives are conducted to replace GNC, with Islamists losing much ground in the council.

13 July 2014  Operation Libya Dawn begins: An Islamist-Misratan militia coalition, with a new government and a new PM forms, to fight the LNA.

26 July 2014 The conflict escalates drastically, with over a hundred thousand persons displaced, foreigners and diplomats evacuated, and the capital airport being damaged beyond usability.

30 July 2014 An Islamist militia conquers much of Benghazi.

4 August 2014 The HoR assembles for its first meeting.

14 August 2014 The UN Secretary-General appoints the first Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Libya.

23 August 2014 The Libya Dawn forces conquer Tripoli, prompting the HoR to relocate to Tobruk, controlled by the LNA.

October 2014 The IS conquers a city in East Libya, marking its emergence.
15 February 2015  IS conquers Sidre, establishing a pseudo-capital.

4 November 2015  A new SRSG is appointed.

17 December 2015  The Libyan Political Agreement is signed.

30 March 2016  The Libya Dawn forces and the remains of General National Council take the form of Government of National Accord and establish themselves in Tripoli.

May 2016  US forces and Misratan militias attack Sirte, aiming to retake the city from the IS.

September 2016  The LNA seizes some of the key oil fields by overcoming the Petroleum Facilities Guard.

17 December 2016  Sirte is conquered from the IS by the GNA. IS no longer controls any territory but some of its dispersed members remain diffused into the Libyan population.

22 June 2017  A new Special Representative of the Secretary-General is appointed.

25 July 2017  France hosts both sides in Paris, with Libyan National Army, not House of Representatives, representing the East, a ceasefire is signed, and Haftar is given an opportunity to legitimize his rule by this means.

20 September 2017  The SRSG proposes the Action Plan for Libya.

25 September 2017  Government of National Accord and HoR representatives meet to amend the LPA, in accordance with the APL.

16 October 2017  HoR withdraws from the APL negotiations, bringing the diplomatic process to an end.

May 2018  Haftar engages on an offensive on GNA territory.

July 2018  Haftar declares that he has eliminated a pocket of IS militants controlling a minor city.

August-September 2018  Reports of infighting in Tripoli among the various militias emerge.

December 2018  The IS conducts an attack in Tripoli on the Foreign Ministry.
February 2019

Despite LNA pressure, the National Oil Corporation, in charge of oil extraction, refuses to continue oil production citing “security concerns”.

April 2019

LNA’s Western Libya Offensive on Tripoli begins and continues to this day. (It must be recorded here that if a breakthrough occurs on this offensive in the two months between the time this report is written and the start of the conference, the issue that must be discussed will have changed radically.)

Relevant UN Treaties and Events

- Adopted by the Security Council at its 6491st meeting, on 26 February 2011 (S/RES/1970)

Previous Attempts to solve the Issue

There have been some attempts to form a united government after the overthrowing of Gaddafi, yet none have been able to provide a stable solution to the conflict that appeased all parties with the power to create disruptions to bring down the arrangements agreed upon.

The first attempt at a solution to the issue had been that of the formation of the General National Council. Yet, the revolutionary forces who brought their forces together to counter the crackdown of the government on the protests and eventually throw them out of power were divided along many lines, forming of all portions of the society. Some of them were Islamist traditionalist while others favoured Western-style reforms. Some of them benefited from Gaddafi’s rule and others strongly disliked such people despite fighting on the same side in the First Civil War. Some of them had worked to reform the regime from the inside while the others had only contempt for any persons who had worked with the Gaddafi regime to any extent. The divisions were clear, and they would continue to cause rivalries among the factions in both the military and political spheres. The existence of many militias in the composition of the revolutionary forces allowed these groups to divide up very easily and disturb the temporary peace created, and the presence of the foreign forces worked to disturb the cohesion among the ranks, destabilizing the integrity of the revolutionary army. After their support in the war, the NATO forces quickly exited the country and barely any foreign support in the post-conflict nation building process was provided. The general elections were rushed after the revolution, preventing the people of
the country from truly democratically reflecting their desires from a new government on the ballots, creating a feeling of dissatisfaction with the status quo among the people. The elections were also stained by reports of conflict around and coercion at the ballot boxes, though the large picture gave a positive impression in the eyes of international observers. The fact that most foreign support was quickly withdrawn after the elections did not help the issues, either. Even after the formation of the new government, the militias were not disbanded and they continued to infight and violate the law, instead following their own leaders’ commands, preventing the central government from gaining full control over the country. While efforts were made to integrate these militias into a national army, the exact specifics of this measure allowed the fractionalization of the army to take place, preventing the measure from achieving its aims. Due to all these reasons, the General National Council’s collapse appeared inevitable, and as elaborated above, a second civil war quickly broke out.

Then the Libyan Political Agreement came about, yet failed even more miserably, in a much shorter time than the GNC. It simply did not cater to General Haftar’s demands, asking any governmental power to be taken away from him, resulting in him simply returning to the helm of his forces to continue the fighting, marking how much influence the one man holds in this conflict. The negotiations of the LPA were also problematic, as the Tripoli government kept abusing the unfair playing field provided in the negotiations due to their internationally recognized status and authority. The fact that House of Representatives, and not General National Council, was present on the negotiation table may have been important for symbolizing the commitment to democracy made by both parties engaged in the talks, yet it meant that figureheads, who did not exactly agree even among themselves on all matters, would represent the militia on whose military rule the authority of the figureheads are entirely based, while the militia would be left outside the talks. The distortion of the interests of the GNC through the layers of representation meant that the deal reached was simply unacceptable to Haftar, prompting him to drive GNC back to war.

When sanctions were tried instead of peace talks, the military leaders and their forces were barely affected, with the foreign countries with interests in the region commonly violating these sanctions, in line with their own interests in Libya. Egypt, above all other parties, have been reported to violate these sanctions, especially in the area of providing weaponry to fuel the conflict. The sales of petroleum have not been ceased either, but they have merely moved to the black market, lowering the profits Haftar may garner from the conflict, yet not eliminating it altogether. While the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011) concerning Libya worked to enhance and enforce the sanctions, its efforts have evidently fallen short of deterring third parties from interfering with the civil
conflict. If more sanctions are sought, it must first be ensured that they will be enforced in some manner guaranteeing their efficacy.

**Possible Solutions**

The most obvious solution to the crisis is through peace talks, as is standard for virtually any other civil insurgency. For these peace talks to be successful, certain measures are needed, which were not found in previous talks. First of all, the currently superior military and territorial status of, as well as the control of the oil fields by, the Libyan National Army must be recognized. It is unfeasible for the LNA to be coerced into following through any deal which they would be clearly disadvantaged by, in light of the present state of the situation; so, the majority of their demands will likely need to be met, even if in some form with mutual compromises. The Tripoli Administration must also be somehow brought to the table, for a fair and enforceable deal to result from the talks, and for that reason, their recent persistence in boycotting such talks must be brought to an end. In order to achieve this, the UN may need to take some radical measures, primarily using their international status, in areas such as recognition in international politics and economic advantages in trade as potential tokens in pre-negotiation. While it is possible for the militias to oppose such measures, providing benefits and assurances, such as offering security from a future government’s punitive efforts for their participation in the war (aside from committing war crimes) and places in a newly-united national army for the militants, to such groups will likely prove useful in getting the final deal enforced. Similar guarantees may also be given to General Haftar’s forces, to assure of their cooperation, as well; while it might seem that General Haftar has centralized command of LNA’s forces, the situation may change rapidly if the militants believe that they are being treated differently than their rivals in the war. The DPKO (Department of Peacekeeping Operations), with the SC’s approval, might also play some role in resolving the strife between the two sides and assuring of a peaceful transition after a deal has been reached. A basis for these talks may be provided by considering the previous drafts for a post-war constitution, the shortcomings of and the sides problems with them may be addressed in a mutually satisfactory manner. Something that will be key to any realizable deal will be dealing with UN agreements resoundingly prohibiting General Haftar from having any role in any post-war government. Such a principle makes achieving an enforceable deal a near impossibility in a country mostly controlled *de facto* by the general himself, making a revision or loosening of this clause a necessity. If the prevention of the repetition of the formation of an authoritarian regime is the intention, a system of checks and balances on a democratic regime, a honorary position as a head of state, rather than of the government, being granted on him, or the provision of a top military office may all be possible resolutions to this problem. Any deal would also need to deal with the future of
the control of the oil fields of the country, and preventing the usurping of the control of it in a post-war Libya by a third party would be essential in the much needed redevelopment of the country after a decade of nearly-ceaseless fighting. The humanitarian crisis that the conflict has brought about must be addressed as well, whether as part of the talks, a deal, or independent SC measures, with the rebuilding of the cities and the infrastructure, especially of vital services such as hospitals and school, carrying a high priority. It also remains important for the first election in a unified Libya to not be marred in accusations of corruption, the use of coercive force and vote count manipulations, for trust to be given to a new government. An end must be brought to the extrajudicial summary punishments and executions, and a reliable legal system must be established, with every Libyan’s human rights being protected. Those displaced by the conflict have largely remained inside the country’s borders, but large-scale displacement was nonetheless observed, making the development to address the resettlement issue, especially to the now-annihilated regions of the cities a necessity.

Bibliography


Skoog, Olof, compiler. *Letter Dated 28 December 2018 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1970 (2011) concerning Libya Addressed to the President of the...*


Appendix or Appendices

I. The page of the UNSC committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011)'s annual reports. A new one will be published before the conference.